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Abstract
We build a model where a postal incumbent o¤ering single piece, transactional
and advertising mail competes with postal entrants and with a rm o¤ering an
alternative medium. We solve for the optimal prices under various competition
assumptions. We calibrate the model and provide numerical simulations in order
to shed light on the impact of these assumptions on volumes and welfare levels.
Keywords: (non) direct mail, substitution, displacement ratio, Ramsey prices,
calibration.
1 Introduction
Since there is a minimum mailing level for senders in the bulk mail market, this
mail is particularly attractive to the universal service provider (USP) and com-
peting postal entrants, in comparison to individual and smaller mailings of single-
piece mail. The traditional bulk mail market can be thought of as serving business
communication needs with other businesses and customers, and includes transac-
tional and advertising mail. Through transactional mail the sender is able to
meet its obligation of providing information to the recipient (examples include
bank statements and utilitiesinvoices). Through advertising mail the sender is
able to provide information to the recipient to encourage a response or purchase.
While the bulk mail market might also comprise of mail used for other purposes,
these two form the focus of this paper.
In recent years mail volumes have been in decline within single piece and bulk
mail. While this is in part a consequence of the economic downturn, it is also due
to the substitution of mail to other communication media. Single piece mail has
been substituted by email; transactional mail has been substituted by statements
and invoices conveyed by email; and advertising mail has been substituted by
alternative digital communication available, for example, through the internet
(Soteri et al, 2009).
Optimal pricing within a global price cap and pricing with workshare discounts
in the bulk mail market have been explored in the literature (De Villemeur et
al 2002, 2003). The e¤ects on welfare and pricing of access and bypass mail
competition in a mails market comprising of a single piece and bulk mail services
have also been looked at in previous literature (De Donder et al 2006, 2008).
Further, the e¤ects on welfare and pricing of a downturn in mail volumes and
potential changes to service quality have also been considered (De Donder et al
2010).
As a further development of this earlier literature, this paper looks at welfare
and pricing where the bulk mail market is considered to comprise of two distinct
markets, of transactional and advertising mail, for which the price elasticities are
di¤erent but the costs of providing those services are the same for postal operators,
whether the USP or competing postal entrants. We proceed with an economic
model and explore the prices for end-to-end and access services within these mar-
kets where the advertising mail market also faces competition from an alternative
communication medium. We calibrate this model to gain further insight on wel-
fare and pricing e¤ects in this wider communication market. As such the paper
provides some further understanding of public interest and pricing policy issues for
the mails market within a communication market whose relevance to and inuence
on the mails market has been increasing in recent years.
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2 The model
There are three markets, one single-piece and two markets in bulk mail (BM):
direct mail (advertising mail, denoted by DM) and non direct mail (transactional
mail, denoted by NDM). For simplicity, we assume that demands in the three
markets are independent from each other (this is not crucial but simplies the
calibration and numerical solving of the model without a¤ecting qualitatively
the results). Throughout the paper, the universal service provider (USP) has
a monopoly, whether de jure or de facto, over single piece mail, and may face
competition in the two bulk mail markets. For simplicity, we assume a competitive
fringe of identical entrants on both bulk mail markets.
On the NDM (transactional) market, the competitors are access-based postal
operators. They o¤er a good which is an imperfect substitute to the NDM product
sold by the USP. On the DM (advertising) market, competitors are both (digital)
media rms not using any postal network, and access-based postal operators.
The three goods o¤ered on this market (the two postal goods and the alternative
medium) are imperfect substitutes.
To summarize, the USP o¤ers three end-to-end products (single-piece mail,
DM and NDM) and two access products (one geared to DM postal operators, the
other to NDM postal operators).
We now introduce some notation. Subscripts stand for the operator: I for
the incumbent postal operator, E for an entrant postal rm and A for alternative
medium rm. The superscript denotes the product: x for single-piece mail, y for
non direct mail and z for direct mail or alternative medium.
Let x denote the quantity of single-piece mail and px its price.
We denote by yI the quantity of NDM sold by the USP, and by p
y
I its price.
Similarly, we denote by yE the quantity of NDM sold by the postal entrants, and
by pyE its price. For each unit of entrants NDM delivered by the USP on behalf
of entrants, entrants pay an access charge of ay.
Let zI denote the quantity of DM sold by the USP, and pzI its price. We denote
by zE the quantity of DM sold by the entrants, and by pzE its price. We denote
by zA the quantity of non postal good (alternative medium) competing with the
entrantsand USPs DM and its unit price by pzA. For each unit of entrants DM
delivered by the USP, entrants pay an access charge of az.
As for costs, we assume that cx is the (constant unit) collection cost for single-
piece, while dx is the (constant unit) single-piece mails delivery cost. As for the
USP, the two categories of BM (DM and NDM) do not di¤er in either collection
or delivery costs: we denote by cyzI the unit and constant collection cost of both
DM and NDM for the USP, and by dyzI the unit constant delivery cost of BM (DM
and NDM) for the USP. To further simplify notation, we assume that dyzI = d
x.
The USP also faces a xed cost, which we denote by F .
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As for postal entrants, we denote by cyE their collection cost for NDM and
by czE their collection cost for DM. Also, to simplify notation, we assume that
czE = c
y
E = c
yz
E : As postal entry is through access only (both for DM and NDM),
we do not need to introduce an entrants delivery cost.
Finally, eA is the alternative media operators constant unit cost of the non-
postal good competing with the USPs and entrantsDM.
We now turn to the demand side. There is one representative sender of mail
(and buyer of non postal good competing with the DM bulk mail products), whose
utility is
u(x) + v(yI ; yE) + w(zI ; zE; zA)
 pxx  pyIyI   pyEyE   pzIzI   pzEzE   pzAzA + I;
where I is the senders exogenous income. By maximizing this utility with respect
to quantities (x; yI ; yE; zI ; zE and zA), we obtain the demand functions
x(px); yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E); yE(p
y
I ; p
y
E); zI(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A); zE(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A) and zA(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A):
The USPs prot function is given by
I = (p
x   cx   dx)x(px) + (pyI   cyzI   dyzI )yI(pyI ; pyE)
+(ay   dyzI )yE(pyI ; pyE) + (pzI   cyzI   dyzI )zI(pzI ; pzE; pzA)
+(az   dyzI )zE(pzI ; pzE; pzA)  F:
Since all entrants (postal and otherwise) behave as a competitive fringe, we
have that pyE = c
yz
E + a
y; pzE = c
yz
E + a
z and pzA = eA, and that prot is nil for the
three kinds of entrants.
The planners social welfare is given by
W = u(x) + v(yI ; yE) + w(zI ; zE; zA)  (cx + dx)x
 (cyzI + dyzI )(zI + yI)  (cyzE + dyzI )yE   (cyzE + dyzI )zE   eAzA + I:
We now turn to the scenarios we study in this paper. They mainly di¤er in
the set of products that are available in the market. For each scenario, we study
the optimal second-best (Ramsey) prices.
3 Scenarios studied
3.1 Monopoly
In this rst scenario, we assume that the USP has a monopoly on the three
markets, and we compare allocations with and without uniform pricing for the two
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types of bulk mail. Utility, demand and prot functions are given by a simplied
version of the functions above where we set the entrantsquantities to zero to
obtain utility functions vM(yI); wM(zI) (the superscript M stands for monopoly)
and demand functions yMI (p
y
I); z
M
I (p
z
I) together with
MI = (p
x   cx   dx)x(px) + (pzI   cyzI   dyzI )zMI (pzI)
+(pyI   cyzI   dyzI )yMI (pyI)  F;
and
WM = u(x) + vM(yMI ) + w
M(zMI )  (cx + dx)x
 (cyzI + dyzI )(zMI + yMI ) + I:
As in De Donder et al. (2006, 2008), we assume that the USP maximizes
welfare under the constraint that it breaks even. These Ramsey prices can also be
attained by subjecting the USP to an optimal global price cap (see La¤ont and
Tirole, 2000). For pedagogical reasons, we start with the case of di¤erentiated
prices, where Ramsey prices solve
max
px;pyI ;p
z
I
WM such that MI  0. (1)
We obtain the following well known rst-order conditions
px   cx   dx
px
=

1 + 
1
"x
; (2)
pyI   cyzI   dyzI
pyI
=

1 + 
1
"y
; (3)
pzI   cyzI   dyzI
pzI
=

1 + 
1
"z
; (4)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the non-negative prot constraint, and where
"x =  px@x(p
x)=@px
x(px)
;
"y =  pyI
@yMI (p
y
I)=@p
y
I
yMI (p
y
I)
;
"z =  pzI
@zMI (p
z
I)=@p
z
I
zMI (p
z
I)
;
are, respectively, the direct price elasticities of the demand for single-piece mail,
non direct mail y and direct mail z when the USP has a monopoly over these
three products.
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Observe from these equations that the optimal, second best Ramsey prices
call for di¤erentiated bulk mail prices as soon as demand price elasticities di¤er
between DM and NDM, even in our environment where their costs are identical.
Observe also that an alternative pricing scheme, such as the equiproportional
markup, would lead to the same price for the two types of bulk mail, since the
same markup would be posted on the same costs for the two goods.
We now study the case where, because for instance of regulatory constraints,
the same price is posted for both the DM and NDM. We then solve the following
program
max
px;pyzI
WM such that MI  0 and pyI = pzI = pyzI , (5)
to obtain the following rst-order conditions
px   cx   dx
px
=

1 + 
1
"x
;
pyzI   cyzI   dyzI
pyzI
=

1 + 
1
"yz
; (6)
where
"yz =  pyzI
@

yMI (p
yz
I ) + z
M
I (p
yz
I )

=@pyzI
yMI (p
yz
I ) + z
M
I (p
yz
I )
is the demand price elasticity for the whole of bulk mail, and can be expressed as
"yz =
yMI (p
yz
I )"
y + zMI (p
yz
I )"
z
yMI (p
yz
I ) + z
M
I (p
yz
I )
;
i.e., as a weighted average of the demand price elasticities for DM and NDM, with
the weights being the market share of these two products in the bulk mail market.
Observe rst that the formula for the optimal single-piece price is the same
whether bulk mail prices are di¤erentiated or not. This is due to our assumption
that demand for single-piece mail and bulk mail are independent. This does not
mean that the optimal price levels will be the same, because the value of the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, , will typically di¤er.
Second, the optimal uniform bulk mail price is given by the usual inverse
elasticity rule, where the relevant elasticity pertains to the whole bulk mail market.
Note that, because the value of  typically di¤ers between the two problems (1)
and (5), we can not state that the optimal uniform bulk mail price (6) is some
average of the optimal di¤erentiated DM (4) and NDM (3) prices.
Since adding a constraint always (weakly) decreases the objective, we can be
sure that the welfare level attained under (5) is lower than that attained under
(1). To quantify this loss of welfare, we have to calibrate the model, which we do
in section 4.
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3.2 Introduction of alternative medium
In this section, we assume that the USP retains its monopoly position on both the
single-piece and NDM market, but faces competition from an alternative medium
in the DM market.
In that case, we have utility functions vM(yI); wPM(zI ; zA) (obtained by set-
ting zE = 0 in function w(zI ; zE; zA), and where the superscript PM stands for
postal monopoly) and demand functions yMI (p
y
I); z
PM
I (p
z
I ; p
z
A); z
PM
A (p
z
I ; p
z
A), to-
gether with
PMI = (p
x   cx   dx)x(px) + (pyI   cyzI   dyzI )yMI (pyI)
+(pzI   cyzI   dyzI )zPMI (pzI ; pzA)  F;
and
W PM = u(x) + vM(yMI ) + w
PM(zPMI ; z
PM
A )  (cx + dx)x
 (cyzI + dyzI )(yPMI + zPMI )  eAzPMA + I:
Ramsey prices solve
max
px;pzI ;p
y
I
W PM such that PMI  0,
which gives the following rst-order conditions
px   cx   dx
px
=

1 + 
1
"x
;
pyI   cyzI   dyzI
pyI
=

1 + 
1
"y
; (7)
pzI   cyzI   dyzI
pzI
=

1 + 
1
"zPM
; (8)
where
"zPM =  pzI
@zPMI (p
z
I ; p
z
A)=@p
z
I
zPMI (p
z
I ; p
z
A)
:
The only di¤erence with the optimal monopoly prices (2) to (4) is in the com-
putation of the relevant direct price elasticity for the direct mail market, which
has now to be done taking into account the existence of the imperfect substitute
represented by the alternative medium. Observe that the cross-price elasticity
of the alternative medium demand with respect to the USPs direct mail price
does not appear in the formula because of our assumption that the alternative
media rms behave like a competitive fringe. With an alternative mediums price
equal to marginal cost, variations in the quantity of alternative medium when pzI
6
is increased only have second order e¤ects on total welfare. This being said, the
optimal price levels will di¤er from (2) to (4) since the value of  will typically
di¤er.
Here also, we need numerical simulations to illustrate the impact of this sce-
nario on prices, volumes and welfare.
3.3 Competition on both BM markets
We now build on the previous section and we introduce access-based (postal)
competition on both bulk mail markets (DM and NDM). In that case, utility,
demand, prot and welfare functions correspond to those developed in section 2.
Ramsey prices solve
max
px;pzI ;p
y
I ;a
y ;az
W such that I  0,
with the following rst-order conditions:
for px : (1 + )(px   cx   dx) @x
@px
+ x = 0;
for pyI : (1 + )

(pyI   cyzI   dyzI )
@yI
@pyI
+ (ay   dyzI )
@yE
@pyI

+ yI = 0;
for ay : (1 + )

(pyI   cyzI   dyzI )
@yI
@pyE
+ (ay   dyzI )
@yE
@pyE

+ yE = 0;
for pzI : (1 + )

(pzI   cyzI   dyzI )
@zI
@pyI
+ (ay   dyzI )
@zE
@pzI

+ zI = 0;
for az : (1 + )

(pzI   cyzI   dyzI )
@zI
@pzE
+ (az   dyzI )
@yE
@pzE

+ zE = 0:
Observe the symmetry between the rst-order conditions for DM (good z) and
NDM (good y): the availability of the alternative medium as an imperfect sub-
stitute to direct mail plays no role in the above formulas. This is due to two
assumptions: i) marginal cost pricing by alternative media rms and ii) no access
is provided to these rms i.e., the USP does not make money on the selling of
alternative medium.
To understand these FOCs, observe that increasing one USP price (say, pyI)
a¤ects both the USPs E2E quantity (yI) but also the quantity of the imperfect
substitute o¤ered by the postal entrants (yE). Each variation in quantity is mul-
tiplied by the margin made by the USP on this product and then weighted by
one plus the Lagrange multiplier of the USP prot constraint. Increasing the E2E
price has also a direct e¤ect on revenue which is measured by the USPs quantity
(yI), which receives a weight of  since it increases prot.
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We can now reformulate these conditions in terms of elasticities:
px = cx + dx +

1 + 
px
"x
;
pyI = c
yz
I + d
yz
I +

1 + 
pyI
"yI
+ (ay   dyzI )yEI ; (9)
ay = dyzI +

1 + 
ay
"yE
+ (pyI   cyzI   dyzI )yIE; (10)
pzI = c
yz
I + d
yz
I +

1 + 
pzI
"zI
+ (az   dyzI )zEI ; (11)
az = dyzI +

1 + 
az
"zE
+ (pzI   cyzI   dyzI )zIE; (12)
where
"x =  px@x(p
x)=@px
x(px)
;
"yI =  pyI
@yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
I
yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E)
;
"yE =  ay
@yE(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
E
yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E)
;
"zI =  pzI
@zI(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
I
zI(pzI ; p
z
E; p
z
A)
;
"zE =  az
@zE(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
E
zE(pzI ; p
z
E; p
z
A)
;
are the direct price elasticities of demands and
yEI =  
@yE(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
I
@yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
I
;
yIE =  
@yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
E
@yE(p
y
I ; p
y
E)=@p
y
E
;
zEI =  
@zE(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
I
@zI(pzI ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
I
;
zIE =  
@zI(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
E
@zE(pzI ; p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
E
;
are displacement ratios, in the spirit of Armstrong (2008) and De Donder (2006).
Optimal prices are then given by the sum of three terms: marginal costs, the
inverse elasticity term and a third term. This last term takes into account the
fact that increasing one USP price displaces demand from that good to the postal
8
substitute. This displacement e¤ect is measured by the displacement ratio, and
is weighted by the margin made selling this good (either directly in the case of an
end-to-end product, or through access). Displacement to the alternative medium
does not appear in the above formulas because i) this good is o¤ered at marginal
cost and ii) the provision of this good does not bring revenues to the USP, as no
access is o¤ered for that product.
We could also impose the constraint that the access charge has to be the
same for both bulk mail products. The formulas we would obtain would be more
complex, without bringing much new intuition (the optimal uniform access charge
would be some weighted average of the determinants of the optimal di¤erentiated
access charges for DM and NDM).
We resort to calibrations and numerical simulation to consider this further.
4 Calibration
Our calibration assumptions are based on De Donder et al (2006, 2008) modied
to take account of the fact that bulk mail is split between direct mail and not-
direct mail. The assumptions are not estimates from a particular postal operator,
but our assessment is that they reect well the general nature of postal markets
and cost structures given published empirical studies.
We start from the hypothetical situation where the USP does not face postal
or non-postal competition (see section 3.1 above). We assume that the USP sets a
price of 0.50e for the single piece product and a price of 0.40e for DM and NDM.
Total quantities sold at those prices are 2bn, 2bn and 6bn items, respectively.
The direct price elasticities are -0.2 for single piece, -1.0 for DM and -0.2 for
NDM (consistent with a price elasticity for bulk mail of -0.4 used in previous
papers (De Donder et al (2006, 2008)).1 We calibrate linear demands based on
these qualities, prices and elasticities.
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for DM and
NDM products when rst an alternative medium competes with DM and second
postal entrants compete with the USPs DM and NDM products through down-
stream access to the USPs network. We use two types of information: the extent
of entry for di¤erent price congurations and the substitutability between the
products within the DM-Advertising market (which by the end includes the prod-
ucts of the USP, postal entrant and alternative medium) and the NDM market
(which by the end includes the products of the USP and postal entrant). With
regards to the extent of entry, we assume for NDM that the entrants market share
is 10% if its price is the same as the USPs and 50% if 20% cheaper. For DM,
1These are closely aligned to observed price elasticities (see Thress (2006) and Veruete-McKay
et al (2010)).
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we rst have to dene the measurement unit for alternative medium. We assume
that one itemof alternative medium refers to the quantity of this medium that
is necessary to have the response rate as one item of DM.2 Equipped with this
denition, we assume that the alternative mediums market share is 25% if 50%
cheaper than the USP and 35% if 75% cheaper than the USP and that the alter-
native mediums market share is 30% if 50% cheaper than the entrant and 40% if
75% cheaper than the entrant. On substitution, we assume the displacement ratio
of mail transferring to the alternative medium, or postal entrant in NDM or DM
is 0.75, which means that three quarters of the quantities sold by entrants are ef-
fectively displaced from the USP, while one quarter represents additional volumes
sold in the sector. As such, the USP and postal entrant products are assumed
to be close substitutes and the alternative medium a more distant substitute to
them.
The USP unit upstream cost is equal to 0.18e for single piece and 0.12e for
the DM and NDM products. The USP delivery cost is 0.12e for single piece, DM
and NDM items. Hence the end-to-end unit costs are the same for the USPs DM
and NDM products. The value of the xed costs F equals 1.680bne so that the
USP breaks even in the hypothetical monopoly situation. The alternative medium
is assumed to have a cost of 0.20e per item. The postal entrants upstream cost
is set at 0.15e per item. As in previous papers (De Donder et al 2006, 2008),
entrants do not face any xed cost.
These assumptions determine the linear demand functions and costs for the
calibrated model consistent with the analytical presentation in this paper (see
Annex 1 for further details).
5 Calibrated results
We set out below the results of the calibrated model, starting with the monopoly
case with di¤erentiated DM and NDM prices and moving to the case where these
prices are uniform, before considering the cases where an alternative medium is
introduced to the DM market and then where, in addition, competitive postal
entry through access to the USPs network is introduced for both DM and NDM.
5.1 Monopoly with di¤erentiated Ramsey prices
In the rst column of gures in Table 1 we show the calibrated monopoly position
(where pxI = 0:5e and p
y
I = p
z
I = 0:4e), and in the second column we show
2So, if the alternative medium is email, and if the response rate of prospective customers to
email is, say, 20 times less than for DM, then one item of alternative medium corresponds to 20
emails.
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the second-best (Ramsey) solution where pyI and p
z
I can be di¤erent (see section
3.1). The second best outcome has a higher price at 0.426 e for NDM (the low
elasticity BM good) and a lower price at 0.288e for DM (the BM good with
a larger elasticity) although their marginal costs are the same- with a weighted
average price of 0.384e - and higher single piece price (of 0.532e). Total volumes
increase from 10bn to 10.457bn items. While the USP still breaks even, the
prot contribution from the DM service is reduced (by 0.197bne) and is o¤set by
increases from single piece (by 0.058bne) and the NDM service (by 0.139bne).
Total consumer surplus increases from 8.900bne to 8.939bne, as the reduction in
consumer surplus for single piece customers (of 0.063bne) and NDM customers
(of 0.152bne) is more than o¤set by the increase in consumer surplus for DM
customers (of 0.255bne).
Insert Table 1 around here
5.2 Monopoly with uniform Ramsey bulk mail prices
When a uniform price constraint is applied to bulk mail (where pyI = p
z
I), the
second best outcome for the monopoly is shown in the third column of gures
in Table 1. The uniform price for bulk mail (0.373e) is in between the optimal
di¤erentiated prices for NDM (0.426 e) and for DM (0.288e) and lower than the
weighted average of the two from column 2. Conversely, the single-piece price
increases from 0.532e to 0.609e so that not di¤erentiating prices for bulk mail by
market segment results in a signicant rise in the single piece price even though
bulk mail and single piece products are not modelled as substitutes. Total volumes
reduce from 10.457bn to 10.133bn items. The USP still breaks even, with the
prot contribution increases for the DM service (by 0.160bne) and single piece
(by 0.132bne) o¤set by a prot reduction from the NDM service. The Lagrange
multiplier increases from 0.104 to 0.148, because the uniform constraint makes it
more di¢ cult for the USP to raise money in the postal market, and total consumer
surplus reduces from 8.939bne to 8.910bne; reductions in consumer surplus for
single piece customers (of 0.149bne) and DM customers (of 0.198bne) are not
o¤set by the increase in consumer surplus for NDM customers (of 0.318bne).
Hence, welfare reduces with the uniform price constraint for bulk mail, and the
burden of it is borne by the single piece and DM customers, to the benet of the
NDM customers. The ranking of welfare levels for the various cases in Table 1
follows that obtained from the analytical part of the paper.
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Table 1: Calibrated results for the USP monopoly 
 
    Monopoly 
Reference    Section 5.1  Section 5.2 
    Calibration With 
different 
prices for 
NDM and 
DM  
With same
prices for 
NDM and 
DM  
Prices (€):     
Single piece  x
Ip   0.500 0.532 0.609
NDM – USP  y
Ip   0.400 0.426 0.373
DM – USP  z
Ip   0.400 0.288 0.373
   
Quantities (bn):   
Single piece  x
Ix   2.000 1.974 1.913
NDM – USP 
Iy   6.000 5.932 6.082
DM – USP 
Iz   2.000 2.560 2.137
Total    10.000 10.457 10.133
   
Contribution to fixed cost –
USP (€bn): 
 
Single piece    0.400 0.458 0.590
NDM    0.960 1.099 0.806
DM    0.320 0.123 0.283
   
Total profit (€bn):    0.000 0.000 0.000
   
Consumer surplus (€bn)   
Single piece    2.500 2.437 2.288
NDM    6.000 5.848 6.166
DM    0.400 0.655 0.457
Total    8.900 8.939 8.910
   
Lagrange multiplier    0.104 0.148
 
 
5.3 Competition in DM through an alternative medium
When competition from an alternative medium is introduced to DM, and the
USP can di¤erentiate in price between DM and NDM (see section 3.2), the sec-
ond best outcome is shown in the rst column of gures in Table 2 (which can
be compared to the second column of gures in Table1). The introduction of
competition to DM drives the USP price lower in the DM-Advertising market
(from 0.288e to 0.274e), and higher in the other two markets although observe
that the size of the variations in prices is quite small. The weighted average price
for DM and NDM increases marginally (from 0.384e to 0.386e) and the single
piece price also increases (from 0.532e to 0.539e). Total volume in the joint
DM and alternative medium part of the Advertising market increases from 2.56
billion items to 2.697billion items, and the alternative medium corresponds to
11.7% of this market in volume, with reductions in volumes for both single piece
and NDM. The Lagrange multiplier increases only marginally from 0.104 to 0.107
with the alternative medium making it more di¢ cult for the USP to breakeven.
The USP still breaks even, with the prot contribution decrease for the DM ser-
vice (by 0.036bne) o¤set by the prot increase from single piece (by 0.011bne)
and the NDM service (by 0.026bne). The total consumer surplus increases (from
8.939bne to 8.951bne) with the added choice of the alternative medium; reduc-
tions in consumer surplus for single piece customers (of 0.012bne) and NDM
customers (of 0.029bne) are more than o¤set by the increase in consumer surplus
for DM customers (of 0.052bne). The increase in consumer surplus for DM is
constrained by the displacement ratio of 0.75 making the alternative medium a
relatively close substitute for DM and the calibration of the alternative medium
having low market shares even when signicantly cheaper than DM. Nevertheless,
the introduction of the alternative medium enhances welfare and still allows the
USP to breakeven within the calibration used.
Insert Table 2 around here
5.4 Competition through an alternative medium in DM
and access to the USPs network for NDM and DM
When competition from postal entry to the USPs downstream network is intro-
duced for NDM and DM along with the alternative medium to DM, and the USP
can di¤erentiate in price between DM and NDM (see section 3.3), the second best
outcome is shown in the second column of gures in Table 2 and can be compared
with its rst column of gures. The USPs single piece, NDM and DM prices are
the same or little changed. In line with the analytical part of the paper, although
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Table 2: Calibrated results for the USP subject to competition from an alternative 
medium to DM and competition from entry through access to the USP’s network 
 
    Competition
    DM medium 
only 
DM medium plus  access entry 
 
Reference    Section 5.3 Section 5.4 Section 5.5: Sensitivities
Assumptions         
With USP DM    Yes Yes No Yes  Yes  Yes
Displacement ratio    0.75 0.75 0.75 0.90  0.75  0.75
Price elasticity (DM/NDM)   ‐1.0/‐0.2 ‐1.0/‐0.2 ‐1.0/‐0.2 ‐1.0/‐0.2  ‐0.8/‐0.267 ‐1.0/‐0.2
Medium share for 50% 
price reduction 
  25% 25% 25% 25%  25%  75%
       
Prices (€):       
Single piece  xIp   0.538 0.537 0.541 0.539  0.581  0.546
NDM – USP  yIp   0.430 0.430 0.433 0.431  0.413  0.437
NDM – access  ya   ‐ 0.265 0.267 0.295  0.252  0.270
NDM – entrants   yEp   ‐ 0.415 0.417 0.434  0.402  0.420
DM – USP  zIp   0.276 0.276 ‐ 0.274  0.288  0.263
DM – medium  zAp   0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200  0.200  0.200
DM – access  za  
‐ 0.150 0.150 ‐  0.160  0.138
DM – entrants  zEp   ‐ 0.300 0.300 ‐  0.310  0.288
       
Quantities (bn):         
Single piece  xIx   1.970 1.970 1.967 1.969  1.935  1.963
NDM – USP  Iy   5.909 5.249 5.241 5.779  5.300  5.230
NDM – entrants  Ey   ‐ 0.882 0.881 0.442  0.867  0.879
DM – USP  Iz   2.380 2.012 ‐ 2.383  1.805  1.432
DM – medium  Az   0.317 0.295 0.446 0.272  0.305  1.515
DM – entrants  Ez   ‐ 0.493 2.114 ‐  0.521  0.147
Total    10.576 10.900 10.648 10.546  10.733 11.166
         
Contribution to fixed cost
– USP (€bn): 
       
Single piece    0.469 0.468 0.475 0.470  0.543  0.483
NDM    1.125 0.997 1.011 1.103  0.915  1.030
DM    0.087 0.073 ‐ 0.082  0.087  0.033
Access NDM    ‐ 0.128 0.130 0.025  0.115  0.132
Access DM      0.015 0.064 ‐  0.021  0.003
         
Total profit (€bn):    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000
         
Consumer surplus (€bn):         
Single piece    2.425 2.426 2.418 2.423  2.341  2.409
NDM    5.819 5.833 5.815 5.816  4.436  5.792
Advertising (DM and    0.707 0.714 0.587 0.708  0.784  1.094
alternative media) 
Total    8.951 8.973 8.820 8.947  7.560  9.294
         
Lagrange multiplier    0.107 0.107 0.109 0.109  0.131  0.111
 
the marginal cost of access for both of these products is the same the USP o¤ers
di¤erentiated access prices of 0.265e and 0.150e for NDM and DM respectively.
This leads to the postal entrant having volume of 0.882bn and 0.493bn items for
NDM and DM respectively. This is not only acquired from the USP volumes, as
the alternative medium volumes also reduce (from 0.315bn to 0.295bn items) and
there is growth in overall volumes as a result of entry of a di¤erentiated product.
The contribution made by single piece, NDM and DM to the USPs breakeven po-
sition is little changed, but the consumer surplus increases for each. Total volumes
increase (to 10.900bn items) and total consumer surplus increases (to 8.973bne).
The introduction of entry through access leads to di¤erentiated access prices for
DM and NDM and an outcome with both USP breakeven and enhanced welfare
within the calibration used.
5.5 Sensitivity analysis
The nal four columns of Table 2 shows, in turn, the e¤ect of a change in one of
four assumptions used in the main calibration. These are discussed briey below
with comparison in each case being with the results in the second column of Table
2.
If the USP does not o¤er a DM end-to-end service (in the rst column of sen-
sitivities see Annex 2 for an analytical description), the USP raises its prices for
all its remaining services other than DM access (which remains at the same price).
DM customers transfer volume from the USP to the alternative medium and the
postal entrant, but the DM and total market volumes reduce. Consumer surplus
reduces in each market and overall. Hence the withdrawal of the DM service by
the USP leads to a reduction in welfare for all customers, and particularly so for
DM customers.
If the displacement ratio is 0.9 rather than 0.75 (in the second column of sen-
sitivities), it reduces the volume growth arising from the transfer of volumes to
access. To recover its costs the USP increases all of its prices, but particularly
its NDM and DM access prices. This reduces the competitiveness of postal entry
through access and, in this case, it can only compete in the NDM market. Con-
sumer surplus decreases in each market and overall, but the reduction is limited
in DM by the USP and postal entrant service being closer substitutes.
If the di¤erence between the own price elasticities for DM and NDM is reduced
(such that the price elasticities are -0.8 and -0.267 for DM and NDM respectively,
thereby retaining an overall bulk mail elasticity of -0.4 in the calibration), it
raises the second best postal prices for DM and single piece and reduces them
for NDM (in the third column of sensitivities). The USP gains volumes in NDM
and loses volumes in DM, with converse movements for the postal entrant and a
marginal increase in volumes for the alternative medium. However, overall, the
13
main e¤ect is a reduction in DM and total market volumes. There is also a higher
Lagrange multiplier, reecting tougher conditions for the USP to breakeven, which
in the welfare-maximising solution it achieves by raising the single piece price
substantially.3
If the market share for the alternative medium were to be 75% instead of 25%
when its price is 50% less than the USPs price (in the fourth column of sensitiv-
ities), signicantly more volumes transfers from DM to the alternative medium
and the overall volume of the DM-Advertising market increases signicantly. The
USP increases its prices for single piece and NDM, and reduces them in DM to
break even, and the postal entrant has similar price movements in NDM and DM.
The volume growth and price reductions in DM-Advertising increase consumer
surplus, and outweigh milder reductions in consumer surplus in single piece and
NDM. While there is a mildly higher Lagrange multiplier, reecting marginally
tougher conditions for the USP to breakeven, which is achieved by raising the
single piece price and NDM prices, total consumer welfare increases substantially.
6 Conclusions
The development of the mails market within a communications market, where
there is increased competition from medium outside of the postal sector, has
a signicant bearing on the optimal pricing and future of the universal service
provision. Within this paper we have developed a framework for assessing both,
with scope to develop further insight of competition and regulatory impacts.
In setting prices in the bulk mail market, there are good economic grounds
for the USP to di¤erentiate its prices between services with di¤erent price elas-
ticities (in this case direct mail and non-direct mail services) even when their
marginal costs are the same. We show how welfare improves without a uniform
price constraint in such a bulk mail market. Part of this improvement in wel-
fare from di¤erentiating prices in the bulk mail market arises from the possibility
this creates for single piece prices to then be lowered and so benet single piece
customers.
The introduction of alternative medium competing with direct mail has the
e¤ect of increasing customer choice and welfare. Within the calibrations used
here the USP continues to breakeven with the introduction of an alternative and
competing medium, primarily because the e¤ect of that medium on USP volumes
and prices is limited. Where these e¤ects are greater and the USP is subject to
price regulation, the USP might not breakeven.
3Note that the absolute value of consumer surplus changes for DM and NDM due to the
e¤ect of the alternative elasticity values on the demand functions for these products.
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The introduction of competition in the bulk mail market, together with the
alternative medium, enhances further customer choice and welfare. Conversely, a
withdrawal of the USP from end to end direct mail reduces customer choice and
welfare.
While it might appear that it would always be better to have all competing
service options available to customers, within our calibrations we show an example
where this is not the case. When the welfare gains from the introduction of access
services is limited, the second best (Ramsey) outcome has the USP price for access
resulting in there being only competition in DM-Advertising from the alternative
medium, and not from postal competition.
Further, with greater competition from the alternative medium to direct mail
over time, the USP will face greater pressure to break even. Within our cal-
ibrations, greater competition from the alternative medium causes the USP to
increase prices elsewhere to compensate for the e¤ect of the loss in volumes to
the alternative medium. For the second best (Ramsey) outcome, the e¤ect on the
USP is likely to be greater, the closer are the own price elasticities for DM and
NDM.
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Annex 1: Calibration
Assuming linear demands, the three utility functions are given by
u(x) = ax  b
2
x2;
v(yI ; yE) = cyI   (d=2)y2I + eyE   (f=2)  y2E   gyIyE;
w(zI ; zE; zA) = hzI   (i=2)z2I + jzE + (k=2)z2E + lzA + (m=2)zA   nzIzE   ozIzA   pzEzA:
We use the calibration assumptions described in section 4 to set the values of
the 16 parameters (a to p), and to obtain the following demand functions, on the
single-piece mail market:
x(px) = 2:4  0:8px;
on the NDM market
yMI (p
y
I) = 7:2  3pyI
yI(p
y
I ; p
y
E) = 4:1011 + 26:3736p
y
E   22:7802pyI ;
yE(p
y
I ; p
y
E) = 4:13187  35:1648pyE + 26:3736pyI ;
and on the DM market
zMI (p) = 4:  5pzI ;
zPMI (p
z
I ; p
z
A) = 3:77534 + 1:75342p
z
A   6:31507pzI ;
zPMA (p
z
I ; p
z
A) = 0:299543  2:3379pzA + 1:75342pzI ;
zI(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A) = 2:31752 + 1:19272p
z
A + 12:9439p
z
E   16:023pzI ;
zE(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A) = 1:94376 + 0:747605p
z
A   17:2586pzE + 12:9439pzI ;
zA(p
z
I ; p
z
E; p
z
A) = 0:215344  2:37028pzA + 0:747605pzE + 1:19272pzI ;
zNE (p
z
E; p
z
A) = 3:81593 + 1:71113p
z
A   6:80203pzE;
zNA (p
z
E; p
z
A) = 0:387855  2:2815pzA + 1:71113pzE:
Annex 2: No USP E2E DM product
We build on section 3.3 and we assume that the USP does not provide an
end-to-end DM product, so that the only postal product in the DM market is
the access-based mail o¤ered by the entrant, which competes with the alterna-
tive medium product. Such a situation could arise for instance if the alternative
medium were priced well below the USP direct mail marginal cost (eA < c
yz
I +d
yz
I )
so that the demand for the USP end-to-end direct mail product is driven to zero.
The analysis for single-piece mail and non direct mail (good y) are the same
as in section 3.3, leading to the same optimality formulas for the prices (of course,
optimal price levels will typically di¤er). We then concentrate on the direct mail
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market (good z). For this market, we have the utility function wN(zE; zA) (where
the superscript N stands for no E2E USP DM product) obtained by setting
zI = 0 in w(zI ; zE; zA) and demand functions zNE (p
z
E; p
z
A) and z
N
A (p
z
E; p
z
A), together
with
NI = (p
x   cx   dx)x(px) + (pyI   cyzI   dyzI )yI(pyI ; pyE)
+(ay   dyzI )yE(pyI ; pyE)
+(az   dyzI )zNE (pzE; pzA)  F;
and
WN = u(x) + v(yI ; yE) + w
N(zNE ; z
N
A )  (cx + dx)x
 (cyzI + dyzI )yI   (cyzE + dyzI )yE   (cyzE + dyzI )zNE   eAzNA + I:
Ramsey prices solve
max
px;pyI ;a
y ;az
WN such that NI  0.
The optimal access price on the direct mail market is given by the inverse elasticity
rule
az = dyzI +

1 + 
az
"zNE
;
where
"zNE =  az
@zNE (p
z
E; p
z
A)=@p
z
E
zNE (p
z
E; p
z
A)
:
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